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1 .  Seman tic Theories of Polarity Item s  
The central idea behind the standard semantic account o f  the 
distribution of negative polarity items (NPls), which goes back to Fauconnier 
( 1 975, 1978) and Ladusaw ( 1 979) ,  is that NPls occur in downward-entailing 
(DE) contexts and denote extreme elements among a set of alternatives .  A 
downward-entailing context for a, i.e. an expres sion XaY, is defined as a 
context where replacing a with a semantically weaker constituent 13 yields a 
stronger expression X!3Y. Linebarger ( 1 980, 1 987, 1 99 1 )  pointed out various 
problems of this account, in particular that many known NPI contexts are not 
really DE, like the protasis of conditionals. But Heim ( 1 987) could defend it 
by showing that the notion of DEnes s  may be suitably restricted: The presence 
of NPls signals DEness along a scale specified by the NPI and with respect to 
a particular position in a sentence. Furthermore, the acceptability conditions of 
NPls are dependent on the current common ground of the conversation. 
In a recent contribution, Kadmon & Landman ( 1 993) claim that NPIs 
based on any indicate a reduced tolerance to exceptions .  For example, a noun 
phrase like any potatoes is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates 
a stronger statement (their principle C). For example, assume that speaker A 
asks speaker B (a cook for a group of 50 people) : 
( 1 )  A:  Will there be  French fries tonight? 
B: No, I don't have potatoes . 
A: Not even just a couple of potatoes that I can fry in my room? 
B:  Sorry, I don't have ANY potatoes . 
According to Kadmon & Landman's description, B had the impression that his 
first answer was misunderstood in a way that potatoes is interpreted as enough 
potatoes for the whole group. In his second answer, the use of ANY potatoes 
indicates that potatoes has to be understood in a wider sense than before. 
Kadmon & Landman offer interesting and convincing solutions for a 
range of putative counterexamples to Ladusaw's theory. But there are als o  
problems with their analysis. First, i t  seems that any expresses widening only 
when it is stressed. Notice that B's first answer in (1 )  could have been, perhaps 
even more naturally, No, 1 don 't have any potatoes, where it is implaus ible that 
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any widening i s  intended, and that B's second answer requires stres s on ANY. 
A second problem is that NPls based on any can be used in contexts where the 
notion of reduced tolerance to exceptions is at least problematic. For example, 
we can say, referring to a particular set of numbers : This set doesn 't contain 
any prime numbers. It seems implausible that any prime numbers induces a 
semantic widening of the precise concept prime number here, or even a 
contextual widening from "small prime number" to "small or large prime 
number" .  Third, a semantic rule like Kadmon & Landman's  (C) is problematic 
for theoretical reasons as it refers in the semantic description of one expres sion 
(any) to the larger context in which this expression is used, and hence is 
intrinsically non-compositional. We may grant (C) the status of a descriptive 
generalization, but the next question should be: At which level is (C) checked, 
and what is responsible for this checking? 
Another recent important contribution to the study of NPls is Zwarts 
( 1 993). Following observations of other authors that not all NPls are equal, 
Zwarts identifies three classes of NPls which he calls "weak" , "strong", and 
"superstrong",  and gives an algebraic characterization of the contexts that can 
host these different types of NPls . 
Weak NPls , like need, care and presumably unstressed any and ever 
require that the context in which they occur is monotone decreasing, or DE. 
Phrased in functional terms, a context f is monotone decreasing iff it holds that 
X�Y entails f(Y)d(X) . We fmd such NPls , for example, in the scope of 
quantifiers like few students or less than three students, which are DE. 
(2) a. Few students have ever gone to the library. 
b. Les s  than three students cared to hand in a paper. 
c. At most five students have gained any financial support. 
Strong NPls , like any student at all, or lift a /inger, bat an eyelash etc. need 
a context that, in addition to being DE, has the property of being "anti­
additive" .  A context f is anti-additive iff f(XuY) = f(X)nf(Y),  where u and (') 
are Boolean disjunction and conjunction. A quantifier like less than three 
students does not qualify, whereas a quantifier like no student does (cf. 3). 
Consequently we fmd contrasts like in (4). 
(3) a. Less than three students smoked cigarettes or drank beer. * 
Less than three students smoked cigarettes and les s  than three 
students drank beer. 
b. No student smoked cigarettes or drank beer. = 
No student smoked cigarettes and no student drank beer. 
(4)a. No student { lifted a finger / read any book at all } .  
b .  *Less th an  three students { lifted a finger/read any book at all } .  
Weak and Strong Polarity Items in Assertions 
induced by Grice's principle of ambiguity avoidance: In case a speaker wants 
to express the -,3 reading the unambiguous form containing anyone is 
preferred . It might very well be that this paradigmatic effect is so strong that 
it is  virtually grammaticalized. 
4.  S tro n g  N Pls a n d  E m phatic Assertion s  
In the preceding sections we have derived the basic facts about the 
distribution of the weak NPI anything. What about the distribution of strong 
NPls? Let us take stressed anything or anything at all as an example. There 
is an important difference between the weak and the strong use of anything : 
(23) Mary didn't get anything for her birthday. 
(24) Mary didn't get ANYthing (at ALL) for her birthday. 
(23) just says that Mary got nothing; (24) stresses the fact that Mary didn't 
even get some minor present for her birthday. This seems to be a fairly 
consistent property of stressed anything and other expressions based on any. 
Kadmon & Landman ( 1 993), who generally investigate stressed any, give a 
wide variety of examples and argue that they involve widening of the extension 
of the noun meaning to include borderline cases. 
To capture cases like (24) we have to assume a slightly different  
interpretation of  anything that highlights the special role of borderline cases , 
and a special type of assertion that carries the implicature expressed by the 
word even in the paraphrase. I propose the following BFA structure for the 
meaning of strong anything : 
(25) ANYthing: (B, thing,  { P I Pcthing 1\ -'m in (P) } )  
Here, m in i s  a second-order property that identifies properties that are 
applicable to "minor" entities of a certain dimension (which is left unexpressed 
here). For example, in (24) the relevant dimension is the clas s of birthday 
presents ; a Porsche would rank: high in that dimension, whereas piece of 
chewing gum would rank: low and probably be considered minor. 
One important requirement for the BFA-structure in (25) is that the 
alternatives are non-exhaustive (cf. 26). This is because thing can be applied 
to minor objects to which no predicate P can be applied. I propose that non­
exhaustivity is the distinguishing semantic property for strong NPls . 
(26) Non-exhaustivity requirement: u{PI Pcthing 1\ ...,m in (P) } c thing 
Let us come now to the type of assertion we found in (24). I claim that 
it is the same type of assertion that we find in the following examples : 
(27) Mary knows every place on earth. She has (even) been to BORneo ! 
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(28) People expected that John would win the election, followed by Bill, 
with Mary as a distant third. But then the election was won by MARY. 
The function of emphatic focus is to indicate that the proposition that is 
actually asserted is prima facie a particularly unlikely one with respect to the 
alternatives .  This meaning component can be made explicit with particles like 
even. Emphatic as sertions are related to what Fauconnier ( 1 975) called 
"quantificational superlatives". Assuming that Albert S chweitzer is a 
prototypical example of a trustworthy person, (29) expresses that John would 
distrust everyone. 
(29) John would distrust Albert S CHWEITzer! 
We may assume that emphatic assertion is due to a particular illocutionary 
operator, Em ph Assert, which is related to strong stress and can be defined as 
follows , where p <c q expres ses that within the common ground c the 
proposition p is less probable than the proposition q. 
(30) EmphAssert« B,F,A» (c) = cnB(F), iff 
a) For all Fe A: cnB(F) <c cnB(F) 
b) cnB(F) <c n{ cnB(F)1 Fe A }  
Felicity condition (a) says that the assertion actually made, cnB(F), is les s 
likely in c than any alternative assertion cnB(F). In our example (29) it is les s 
likely that John would distrust Albert Schweitzer than that he would distrust 
any other person. Condition (b) says that the assertion actually made is less 
likely in c than the conjunction of all the alternative assertions. For our 
example, the common ground c must support the possibility that John would 
distrust all other persons but still he wouldn't distrust Albert Schweitzer. Only 
then the proposition that John would distrust Albert Schweitzer is a truly 
exceptional and unlikely one. Notice that the two conditions (30.a) and (b) are 
logically independent of each other. In particular, (a) does not entail (b), as the 
common ground c could contain the information that although Albert 
Schweitzer is the most trustworthy person, if someone distrusts every other 
person, then he distrusts Albert Schweitzer as well, and hence the left-hand 
side and the right-hand side of (b) would be equally likely. And (b) does not 
entail (a), as it might be that it is les s  probable that John distrusts Albert 
Schweitzer than that John distrusts all other persons together, but still there is 
one person (say, Mother Teresa) such that the propositions that John distrusts 
Albert Schweitzer and the proposition that John distrusts Mother Teresa are 
equally unlikely. Only (a) and (b) together guarantee the extreme status of B(F) 
with respect to the B(F). 
Now, a probability relation like <c is related to semantic strength in the 
following way: If p and q are comparable in their strength (i.e. we have either 
p� or qQl), and furthermore p <c q, then also pcq. That is, if p is less  likely 
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( 1 6) A = { . . .  , $ 1 998 ,  $ 1 9 9 9 ,  $200 1 ,  $2002 . . . } 
Then the assertion of ( 1 5) can be analyzed as follows , using the previously 
defined as sertion operator; from here on I will generally suppress condition 
( 14.b) for s implicity. 
( 1 7) A ssert ({A.Q. { il earn ;(m ,Q) } '  $2000 ,  A»)(c) = cn { i l  earn ;(m ,$2000 ) } 
iff for all Fe A with cn{ iI earn ;(m ,F) } =F- cn{ i l earn ;(m ,$2000 ) } :  
Speaker has reasons not to propose cn{ il earn ;(m ,F) } . 
In the current example the proposition asserted and the alternative propositions 
stand in a relation of semantic strength to each other: Mary earns $2000 entails 
Mary earns $n, for n<2000, and is entailed by Mary earns $m, for 2000<m. 
In such cases we can distinguish two systematic types of reasons the speaker 
has if he wants to be both truthful and informative: (i) If [cnB(F)] c [cnB(F)] , 
the reason is that [cnB(F)] would be less informative. (ii) If [cnB (F) ]  c 
[cnB(F)] ,  the reason is that the speaker lacks sufficient evidence for proposing 
[cnB(F)] as the new common ground. If the speaker does not indicate 
otherwise -- e.g. by Mary earns at least $2000, or Mary earns $2000, and 
perhaps more -- the reason is more specifically that the speaker knows that 
[cnB(F)] is false, and the hearer is entitled to draw this inference. 
Of course, (i) is (one part of) Grice's maxim of Quantity, and (ii) is 
Grice's maxim of Quality (cf. Grice 1 975). Notice that Quantity reasons are 
related to weaker propositions ,  whereas Quality reasons are related to stronger 
propositions . 
The configuration we find with scalar implicatures is an important 
subcase of the general assertion rule. This warrants the introduction of a 
special operator, ScalAssert. Its triggering condition is that the proposition 
actually asserted and the the alternative assertions are informationally ordered 
with respect to each other. And it conveys the implicature that all propositions 
that are semantically stronger than the proposition made are negated. 
( 1 8) Assert« B,F,A» (c) = ScaIAssert« B,F,A» (c), 
if for all Fe A: [cnB(F)]�[cnB(F)] or [cnB(F)]�[cnB(F)] 
( 1 9) ScaIAssert« B ,F,A» (c) = 
{ ie ci ie B(F) 1\ ...,3Fe A[[cnB(F)]c[cnB(F)] 1\ ie B (F)] } 
Let us apply this view of assertion to our NPI examples. They clearly satisfy 
the condition for scalar implicatures.  For the ungrammatical example ( 1 1 )  we 
get the following result: 
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(20) Sca IAssert« AQAi3y[Qj(y) /\ saw j(m ,y») , t h i n g ,  ( PI Pct h i n g } » (c) 
= t iE d  3y [th i n g j(y) /\ saw j(m ,y») /\ 
...,3Pcth i n g [ { ie d  3y[Pj(y) /\ saw j(m ,y)] } c t iE d 3y[t h i n gj(y) /\ 
s aw j(m ,y)] } /\ 3y[P j(y) /\ saw ;(m ,y)] ] ] } 
Notice that the first conjunct -- that Mary saw a th ing -- and the second 
conjunct -- that there is no P, Pcth in g, such that Mary saw a P -- contradict 
each other for every common ground c. Whenever Mary saw some x that is a 
th ing ,  x will fall at least under some property P that is defined more narrowly. 
Technically, every input common ground c will be reduced to the empty set. 
For the grammatical example ( 12) we get the following result: 
(2 1 ) Sca IAssert«AQAi3y[Q(y) /\ s aw j(m ,y)] , th ing,  { PI Pcth i n g  }))(c) 
= ( ie d ...,3y[th ing j(y) /\ saw j(m ,y)] /\ 
...,3Pcth i n g [ { ie d  ...,3y[Pj(y) ·/\ saw j(m ,y)] } c 
( ie c I -,3y[thing j(y) /\ saw j(m ,y)] } /\ ...,3y[Pj(y) /\ saw j(m ,y)]] ] } 
The first conjunct restricts the common ground c to those worlds i for which 
Mary didn't see a th ing .  The s.econd conjunct is trivially satisfied here, as it 
holds for no P, Pcthing,  that the proposition that Mary didn't see a P is 
stronger than the proposition that Mary didn't see a th ing . The difference 
between our two examples is that in ( 1 1 )  the proposition B (F) is at least as 
weak as any alternative proposition, whereas in ( 12) B(F) is at least as strong 
as any alternative. 
It is important to realize the nature of this explanation for the 
distribution of NPls . A sentence like ( 1 1 ) is not simply bad because it would 
express a very general meaning. There are sentences that do that without being 
ungrammatical, namely tautologies like War is war. Rather, ( 1 1 )  is bad because 
it expresses a sentence in which what is said systematically contradicts what 
is implicated. The assertion made by ( 1 1 )  says that Mary saw something, but 
the implicatures deny that Mary saw anything in particular. The explanation 
why ( 1 1 )  is bad may become clearer when we contrast it with the following 
sentence, which is good although it expresses the same proposition as ( 1 1 ) :  
(22) Mary saw something. 
Aay[thing j(y) A saw j(m ,y)] 
In contrast to anything in ( 1 1),  something in (22) does not introduce any 
alternatives and hence does not induce any alternative-related implicatures. This 
is at odds with a common analysis that says that something is a positive 
polarity item, which should work like an NPI except for the nature of the scale. 
However, I contend that NPs based on some are not polarity items at all. The 
observation about the scope differences in cases like Mary didn't see anyone 
(-.3) and Mary didn 't see someone (3...,) that have been adduced for the positive 
polarity status of someone should rather be explained as a paradigmatic effect 
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Here, t h i n g is the most general property (a notion that depends on the context 
and on selectional restrictions in ways that are not accounted for here) .  The 
precise nature of the background B is a function of the syntactic pos ition in 
which anything occurs , e.g. as object or subject. The alternatives are a set of 
properties that are stronger than the most general property, th ing .  The way I 
have rendered this set, { PI Pahin g } ,  i .e . the set of all such properties , is 
clearly too general, as it allows for very strange properties . I intend that P 
ranges only over standard properties . I am not in a position to define this 
notion, but one obvious requirement is that standard properties can be 
expressed in natural language. One important requirement for the set of 
alternatives is that it is exhaustive in the sense that all the alternatives together 
make up the foreground: 
( 1 0) Exhaustivity requirement: u{ PI Pah ing } = th ing  
We can formulate rules for the semantic composition of  meanings that ensure 
that the information about the foreground and its alternatives are projected to 
complex expressions ,  along the lines of Krifka ( 1 992b), which I will not repeat 
here. These rules will give us BFA representations of the following kind :  
( 1 1 )  Mary saw anything: 
(AQA.i3y[Q(y) 1\ sawj(m ,y)] , thing,  { PIPahing })  
( 1 2) Mary didn't see anything : 
(A.QAi .... 3y[Q(y) 1\ saw j(m ,y)] , thing, { PIPcthing } } 
Notice that when we apply B to F we get a standard representation, for 
example A.i3y[thingj(y) 1\ sawj(M ary ,y)] , the set of worlds i where Mary saw 
something, for ( 1 1 ) .  
One fact that will be crucial is  that in both cases ( 1 1 )  and ( 1 2) we 
obtained a BFA structure that defmes a proposition, B(F), and a set  of 
alternative propositions, {pi  3F[Fe A 1\ p=B(F)] } .  And as we have a certain 
logical relationship between the foreground F and its alternatives F (F being 
weaker than any alternative F), we have a certain logical relationship between 
B(F) and its alternatives B(F). In the case of ( 1 1) B(F) is weaker than any 
alternative proposition B(F): The set of worlds where Mary saw something or 
other is a proper superset of every set of worlds where Mary saw something 
that is described in more specific terms. In the case of ( 12) B(F) is stronger 
than any alternative proposition, as the set of worlds where Mary didn't see 
anything is a proper subset of the set of worlds where Mary didn't see 
something that is described in more specific termS. Hence we can say that the 
logical relationship between F and its alternatives is "preserved" in the 
semantic compositions that lead to ( 1 1), but it is "reversed" in the semantic 
composition with negation that leads to ( 12). In both cases we may say that the 
BFA structure is "projected". 
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So much for the semantic part of the story. The question now is ,  why 
is ( 1 1 )  bad,  but ( 1 2) good? I propose that the reason for this is to be found in 
pragmatics , in particular, in the felicity condition s  for as sertions .  
3 .  Th e  Pragm atics of S tandard Assertion  
Let us  adopt the following, rather standard theory of  assertions (cf. 
Stalnaker 1972): The participants of a conversation assume, for every stage of 
the conversation, a mutually known common ground c. For our purposes we 
can represent common grounds as sets of possible worlds . If one participant 
asserts proposition p, and the audience does not object, the current common 
ground c is restricted to cnp. We may assume certain felicity conditions , e.g. 
that cnp ;z!: c (that is , p expresses something that is not yet establis hed), and 
that cnp ;z!: 0 (that is, p does not express something that is taken to be 
impossible). I will disregard these  felicity conditions in what follows . We may 
stipulate an assertion operator Assert that, when applied to a proposition,  takes 
an input common ground c to an output common ground cnp: 
( 1 3) Assert (p)(c) = cnp 
What about the assertion of a sentence with a BFA structure? I propose 
that BFA assertions come with two general felicity conditions :  (a) that the 
speaker has reasons not to assert the propositions that are based on one of the 
alternatives and would yield a different common ground as output, and (b) that 
there are such alternatives in the fIrst place: 
( 1 4) Assert« B,F,A» (c) = cnB(F), iff: 
a) For all Fe A such that cnB(F) ;z!: cnB(F) : 
the speaker has reasons not to assert B (F), 
that is, to propose cnB(F) as the new common ground. 
b) There are Fe A such that cnB(F) ;z!: cnB(F). 
If (a) and (b) are not met, the assertion is undefIned. But in general the 
conditions will trigger accomodation of the common ground. Condition (a) 
states that the speaker has reasons for not asserting alternative propositions 
B(F). There are various possible reasons -- the speaker may know that B(F) 
is false or lack sufficient evidence for it. One typical case has been described 
as scalar implicature (cf. Gazdar- 1979, Levinson 1 984). Example: 
( 15) Mary earns $2000. 
Implicature: Mary doesn't earn more than $2000. 
This implicature arises in the following way. Let us assume that $2000 
introduces a set A of all alternative amounts of money, e.g. 
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Superstrong NPIs , for which Zwans gives the Dutch example mals (lit. 'tender, 
soft') and the English example one bit, can only occur in a context that is 
downward-entailing, anti-additive and satisfies the condition f(""X)::-"'If(X),  
where . .  ...,. .  expresses generalized negation or complementation; Zwans calls 
these contexts "anti-morphic" .  A quantifier like no student does not satisfy this 
condition, but a quantifier like John does (cf. 5) .  Consequently, we find 
contrasts as the ones illustrated in (6) : 
(5) a. No student wasn't happy. =I: It is not the case that no student was happy. 
b. John wasn't happy. = It is not the case that John was happy. 
(6) a John wasn't one bit happy about these facts. 
b. *No linguist was one bit happy about these facts .  
Although Zwarts' study i s  a very important contribution that adds 
considerable refinement to our understanding of NPls , it has some empirical 
problems and leads to new theoretical challenges .  First, the distinction between 
the three classes of polarity items is less  clear than suggested by Zwarts . For 
one thing, contrasts like (4.a) vs .  (b) indicate at most a strong tendency. 
Furthermore, various NPls classified as weak by Zwarts , like hurt a fly, seem 
to be rather of the strong type. Second, there seems to be an interesting relation 
between NPI types and stress that Zwarts does not mention and that does not 
follow straightforwardly from his analysis : As a general rule, weak NPls are 
unstressed, whereas strong NPls attract stress. This can be seen in the contrast 
between weak any and strong any (whatsoever) and its Dutch and German 
equivalents ook maar iets and auch nur irgendetwas: 
(7) a. No child got any presents/ANY presents (whatsoEVer). 
b. Less than three children got any presents/*ANY presents (whatsoEVer). 
Third, the conditions of monotone decrease and anti-additivity are not sufficient 
for Zwans' purposes , as they are satisfied by a function f that maps every set 
X to a specific element. One example is the quantifier zero or more students, 
which always yields a true sentence when combined with a VP. However, this 
quantifier does not license NPls , neither strong ones nor weak ones.  
Another problem is that the class of superstrong NPls does not seem 
to be defmable in terms of anti-morphicness, or in any algebraic terms for that 
matter. If it were, we should not fmd any contrast between the following 
examples , contrary to the facts:  
(8) a .  John wasn't one bit happy about these facts.  
b.  *It is not the case that John was one bit happy about these facts .  
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It seems that Zwarts ' clas s of superstrong NPls are all parts of an idiom that 
contains an overt negation as the other part, e .g . NEG . . .  one bit. I will disregard 
this clas s in the present article. 
A more general problem that can be addressed to all existing semantic 
accounts of NPIs is that they are far from an explanative theory of polarity 
phenomena. Why do NPIs require DE contexts in the fIrst place? Why do 
strong NPIs in addition require something like anti-additivity? Only when 
questions such as these are answered within a more general setting can we 
speak of a satisfying theory of polarity items. This is what I try in this paper. 
I will propose that the distribution of NPIs can be derived from the interaction 
between their meaning and the meaning of expressions in which they occur, 
and certain general pragmatic rules that come with the illocutionary force of 
the sentence. The theory of polarity items proposed here is an elaboration of 
ideas presented fIrst in Krifka (1 990, 1 992a). A more comprehensive version 
of the theory proposed here is given in Krifka (in preparation). 
2.  The Sem antics of W eak NPI " any"  
I will develop the theory I am going to propose with a simple example: 
licensing of the NPI anything in the scope of negation in an assertion. The 
basic assumptions concerning the semantics of NPls like anything are: (a) NPls 
introduce alternatives ; and (b) the alternatives induce an ordering relation of 
semantic specifIcity, where the NPI itself denotes a most specifIc element. 
According to (a), NPIs resemble items in focus as viewed by focus 
theories such as Rooth ( 1985, 1992). I will incorporate alternatives with the 
help of structured meanings which have been developed to capture the 
semantic impact of focus (cf. Jacobs 1984, von Stechow 1 990). More 
specillcally, I will use triples (B,F,A), where B stands for the background, F 
for the foreground (the polarity item or the item in focus), and A for the set 
of alternatives to F. The set of alternatives A contains items of the same type 
of F, but not F itself. Typically, when B is applied to F, we will get a standard 
meaning B (F) . 
Semantic strength, rendered by It!:;", is defIned for all types based on 
the truth-value type t as follows : If a, � are of type 1, then a!:;� iff a � f3. And 
if a, � are of type (o,t), then a!:;� iff for all y of type 0: a(y) !:; f3(y). For 
example, if P, Q are properties (type (s,(e,t»), then P!:;Q iff 'vTv'x[P(i)(x) � 
Q(i)(x)} . Thus, we have sparrowg,ird , as the set of sparrows is a subset of 
the set of birds in all possible worlds i. As usual I will write ac� iff a!:;f3 and 
..,�!:;a, and say that a is "stronger" than f3. 
Let me introduce an example. The NPI anything is analyzed as the 
following BFA-structure: 
(9) anything : (B, thing, {PI Pcthing }) 
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than q in c, then c allows for q-worlds that are not p-worlds ,  but not vice 
versa. Hence (30) amounts to the following condition for BFA-structures when 
the proposition expres sed and its alternatives are related by semantic strength :  
(3 1 )  If for all F'e A:  cnB(F') !;;::; cnB(F) o r  cnB(F) !;;::; cnB(F') : 
Emph Assert« B,F,A» (c) = cnB(F) iff 
a) For all F'e A: cnB(F) c cnB(F') 
b) cnB(F) c n{ cnB(F') 1  F'e A }  
The felicity condition (a) says that the proposition actually asserted, cnB(F) , 
must be stronger than every alternative proposition cnB(F') .  And condition (b) 
says that that proposition must be stronger than the conjunction of all the 
alternative propositions .  
If the alternatives are generated by a NPI the proposition expres sed and 
its alternatives are indeed related by semantic strength, and hence emphatic 
assertion amounts to (3 1 ) .  It turns out that a sentence like (32.a) is indeed a 
good emphatic assertion, in contrast to sentences like (32.b). 
(32) a. Mary didn't get ANYthing. 
b. *Mary got ANything. 
Sentence (32.a) will yield the following BFA-structure: 
(32')a. (AQAi--.3y[Qj(Y) /I. get j(m ,y)] ,  th ing ,  { PI Pcthing  /I. -'m in (P) } )  
Applying EmphAssert will get u s  a good result for cornmon grounds c if the 
following conditions are satisfied: (a) For all Pcthing with -.m in(P) it holds 
that ( ie d --.3y[thingj(y) /I. getj(m ,y)] } c ( ie d --.3y[Pj(y) /I. getj(m ,y)] } ,  that is, 
the proposition that Mary didn't get a thing is not only as strong as, but 
stronger than any proposition that Mary didn't get some non-minor P, P c 
thing . (b) It holds that ( ie cl -.3y[thinglY) /I. getj(m ,y)] } c n{ ( ie d -.3y[Pj(y) 
/I. getj(m ,y)] } 1  Pcthing /I. --.min(P) } , that is , the proposition that Mary didn't 
get a thing is stronger than the conjunction of the propositions that Mary didn't 
get some non-minor P, P c thing .  Conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied for 
common grounds c that contain the information that it is prima facie les s  likely 
that Mary didn't get something including minor things than that Mary didn't get 
something excluding minor things. In other words, c must support the 
expectation that Mary got at least something minor, if not more. This is indeed 
the case for all common grounds in which a sentence like (32.a) is felicitous . 
Sentence (32.b) , on the other hand, will obviously lead to conditions 
that cannot be satisfied when emphatically asserted. In particular, condition (a) 
would amount to the requirement that for all Pcthing,  -.m in(P) it holds that 
( ie d3y[thingj(y) /I. getj(m ,y)] } c ( ie d 3y[Pj(y) /I. getj(m ,y)] } ,  the proposition 
that Mary got a thing is stronger than the proposition that Mary got a P, where 
Pcthing. This is a contradiction. 
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5. Th e D istri b u t ion of W eak a n d  S tro n g N P Is C o m pared 
One important question at this point is whether the semantics and 
pragmatics of as sertions with weak and strong NPls developed above captures 
the facts about their respective distribution, as discussed by Zwarts ( 1 993) .  
Let me first point out some differences between the theory proposed 
here and the one of Zwarts . A difference of minor importance, due to my 
attempt to simplify matters , is that where Zwarts effectively formulates 
conditions for all alternatives of an NPI, I restrict myself to conditions that just 
affect the NPI itself in its relation to the alternatives . A more relevant point is 
that in assuming an intensional representation, I have sets of worlds where 
Zwarts just has less articulate truth values . Also, where Zwarts assumes that 
the semantic relations that characterize the distribution of polarity items hold 
in general, I assume that they may hold just for suitable common grounds ,  and 
hence that NPIs may select or accomodate their common grounds.  Another 
important distinction is that anti-additivity is replaced by emphatic as sertion as 
the crucial property for strong NPI contexts . In the current theory the algebraic 
property that is required by emphatic assertion is "strict decrease" :  If XcY, 
then f(Y)cf(X). The conditions of anti-additivity and strict decrease are not 
directly comparable; one is not a logical consequence of the other. But 
remember that anti-additivity is problematic , as shown in section ( 1 )  with 
quantifiers like either zero or more than zero students; strict decrease doesn't 
run into this problem. 
Of course, I will have to show that Zwarts' central observation is 
captured, namely that strong NPls in emphatic as sertions are problematic in the 
scope of determiners like less than three girls, but fine in the scope of 
determiners like no girl. Let us first discuss the following contrast: 
(33) a. Less than three children got anything. 
b. *Less than three children got ANYthing (at ALL). 
In the present account, (33.a) is a standard (scalar) assertion with a weak NPI 
anything, whereas (33.b) is an emphatic assertion with a strong NPI ANYthing 
at ALL. The theory developed so far predicts that (a) is good and (b) is bad. 
As for (33.a) we get the following representation according to (33): 
(33')a. ScaIAssert« t..Qt..i[#{xl 3y[chi Idlx) A Q(y) A got j(X,y)] } <3] , 
thing, { PI Pcthing })(c) 
= t iE d #{ xi 3y[childj(x) A thin gj(y) A got;(x,y)] } <3 A 
...,3Pcthing[ { ie d  #{ xl 3y[chiId j(x) A Pj(y) A gotj(x,y)] } <3 }  c 
t iE d #{xl 3y[ch iId j(x) A th in gj(y) A got;(x,y)] } <3 } 
A ( • • •  )] } 
This assertion is felicitous with respect to many comon grounds c. The first 
conjunct reduces c to those worlds i in which less  than three children got a 
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th ing .  The second conjunct is trivially satisfied, as there is no P such that the 
set of worlds in which les s than three children got a P is a proper subset of the 
set of worlds in which les s than three children got a th ing ,  P being a proper 
subset of th ing .  -- As for (33.b) we arrive at the following representation, 
according to (3 1 ) :  
(33')b.  E m  p h  Assert «(AQAi[#{ xl 3y[ch i ld j(x) A Q(y) A got j(X,y)] } <3] , 
th in g , { PI Pcthi n g  A ""m in (P) } ) (c) 
= { ie d  #{ xi 3y[ch i ld j(x) A th ing j(y) A got j(x,y)] } <3 } ,  provided that 
a) V'Pcthing ,""m in (P) : { ie d#{ xI3y[chi l d j(x) A th i n gj(y) A gotj(x,y)] } <3 }  
c { ie d  #{ xi 3y[ch i ld j(x) A Pj(y) A gotj(x,y)] } <3 }  
b) ( . . . ) 
It turns out that condition (a) is violated in this case. To see this , we 
have to distinguish between three cases : 
(i) Assume first that in the worlds i in c, either no child got anything, 
or three or more children got something non-minor. In this case we would have 
equality between the two sets compared in (a) . Hence such a common ground 
c can be excluded. Informally, one would not utter (33.b) if it were already 
established that either no child got anything or three or more children got 
something.  
(ii) Assume now that the condition in (i) does not apply, i .e . ,  there are 
worlds i in which only one child or two children got something, but all that the 
children got in i is something minor. For all such i it will also hold that less  
than three children (as a matter of fact, no child) got something that falls under 
an alternative non-minor property P. Again, we would end up with equality, 
and such a common ground c would be disallowed. 
(iii) Assume now that conditions (i) and (ii) do not apply , i.e, there are 
worlds i in which one child or two children got something that is non-minor, 
but it is not the case that three or more children got something. This is clearly 
the most natural case. We then can construct a set that contains exactly what 
the children that got something non-minor in i got in i. Call this set Gj. We can 
do this for every world i ,  and we can construct a property G that maps every 
world i to Gj. Oearly we have Gcthing in all natural models , as there will be 
objects that no child got in some i. Furthermore G is non-minor, according to 
our assumption. Also G can be expressed in natural language, e.g. by the 
phrase what the children got, or perhaps what the children got that is worth 
talking about (to exlude the "minor" gifts). But note that we have, due to the 
construction of G, { ie d #{xI3y[child j(x) A thingj(y) A gotj(x,y)] } <3 } = { ie d 
#{ xl 3y[chiId j(x) A Gj(y) A gotj(x,y)] } <3 } . What this means is that the assertion 
based on thing is not stronger than the assertion based on G. Informally, Less 
than three children got anything and Less than three children got what they 
got will give us the same proposition. Hence a felicity condition of emphatic 
assertion is violated: There are alternative propositions that are as strong as the 
proposition that is asserted. 
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Together, ( i ) ,  (i i) and (iii) show that there are no common grounds c 
that could satisfy the felicity condition of emphatic assertions (33' .b) ,  and 
hence (33.b) is bad.  Let us contrast (33.b) with an example that involves an 
anti-additive quantifier, no child, and which is good (34). The corresponding 
felicity condition for this case is given in (35). 
(34) No child got ANYthing at ALL. 
(35) 'v'Pcthin g ,-,m in (P) : { ie ci #{ xi 3y[chi l d j(x) 1\ th i ng j(y) 1\ got j(x,y)] } =O } 
c { iE ci # { xi 3y[chi ldlx) 1\ Ply) 1\ gotj(x,y)] } =O } 
There are natural common grounds c that satisfy this condition. In particular, 
we cannot construct a natural property like G in the previous case, as it is 
explicitly denied, for every world i, that there are children that got something 
in i . To see this, we may try to construct such a property as follows : Let Hj be 
the set of (non-minor) entities that no child got in i, and let H be the function 
that maps every world i to Hj. If the common ground c contains at least some 
worlds in which some children got something, then we have Hcth ing, but 
{ iE ci #{ xi 3y[ch i ld j(x) 1\ th i n gj(y) 1\ gotj(x,y)] } =O } = { iE ci #{ xi 3y[ch ild j(x) 1\ 
Hj(y) 1\ gotj(x,y)] } =O } .  But notice that H is a rather curious property that 
should be excluded as an alternative to th ing . For one thing, H is defined 
negatively, which should be possible only with respect to a fixed domain of 
discourse; a phrase like what the children didn 't get is well-formed only if the 
context provides a definite set of things. Furthermore, notice that it holds for 
all worlds i in the resulting common ground that Hj = thing j, as for every such 
i the things no child got is the set of all things . Hence, with respect to the 
resulting common ground, H should not count as a proper alternative to thing.  
We can discard H as an alternative by explicitly requiring that emphatic 
as sertions, or perhaps assertions in general, are felicitous only under the 
following condition: 
(36) E m phAssert « B,F,A» (c) is felicitous only if 
there is no F'E A with { FjliE C }  = { F'jliE C }  
That is , emphatic assertion requires that the extension of the foreground does 
not collapse with the extension of any alternative. In other words, the 
foreground must remain an extreme semantic entity. 
Another structural difference between Zwarts' theory and the one 
developed here is that Zwarts just gave a semantic characterization of the 
contexts that host weak vs . strong NPls, whereas I tried to give in addition a 
semantic characterization of weak and strong NPIs themselves ,  in terms of 
exhaustivity. According to Zwarts' observations we should then expect that 
exhaustive NPIs cannot occur in emphatic assertions, and that non-exhaustive 
NPIs cannot occur in standard assertions. 
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As for the first of these claims , notice that if we have an exhaus tive 
NPI with meaning F and set of alternatives A, where F = uA, then it follows 
for any common ground c and downward-entailing  background B that cnB(F) 
= { cnB(F)1 Fe A } ,  and this violates felicity condition (3 1 .b) for emphatic 
assertions .  This can be illustrated with the following example: 
(37) John didn't eat anything. 
As sume that anything is exhaustive. For specificity, assume that selectional 
restrictions require that the foreground is the property ed ib le . th ing ,  and assume 
two alternatives m eat and vegetable such that ed ib le . th ing  = m eat U 
vegetab le .  Then clearly the proposition that John didn't eat an e d i b le .th ing  is 
equal to the proposition - that John didn't eat m eat and John didn't eat 
vegetab le , for every common ground. Hence, if (37) is an emphatic assertion, 
condition (3 1 .b) would be violated. If it is just a standard as sertion, (37) is of 
course fine. 
What about strong, non-exhaustive NPls in standard assertions? The 
facts are perhaps subtle, but observe that NPls like anything at all, or perhaps 
clearer lift a finger, lead to problematic results if they are not emphatically 
stressed. The theory developed so far does not predict this ,  as the requirements 
for standard assertions are so weak that non-exhaustive NPls clearly satisfy 
them. In particular, if we have an exhaustive NPI with meaning F and 
alternatives A then it will hold for all common grounds and downward­
entailing backgrounds B that for all Fe A, cnB(F) � cnB(F). 
I would like to suggest that non-exhaustive NPIs in standard assertions 
are disfavored because one crucial property of non-exhaustive NPIs , namely 
that their foreground is a truly extreme element with respect to the alternatives , 
does not get exploited in standard assertions. Standard assertions of a BFA 
structure (B,F,A) allow for alternatives F such that cnB(F) = cnB(F). That 
is , they allow that the foreground proposition and certain alternative 
propositions collapse into one. This should be disallowed for non-exhaustive 
NPIs ; the foreground of non-exhaustive NPIs should always play a unique role. 
We may as sume that the motivation for that phenomenon is pragmatic: If a 
speaker introduces "extreme" polarity items then he must make appropriate use 
of this feature. However, it is unclear to me how to enforce this for non­
exhaustive NPIs short of stipulating a general requirement for semantic 
compositions that they preserve the unique role of the foreground. 
6. Idiom atic Polarity Items that Denote Sm all or Large Entities 
In the previous sections we have discussed the general outline of the 
proposed theory with one particular example, anything. In this section I will 
discuss one very characteristic type of polarity items, namely expressions that 
denote small entities of a certain sort 
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(38) a. John didn't drink a drop (of alcohol) for two days . 
b. Mary didn't utter { a  word / a syllable } . 
c. John doesn't have a red cent. 
Take a drop as an example. In its NPI use it applies to minimal liquid 
quantities ,  that is, to semantic atoms , and its alternative predicates apply to 
bigger liquid quantities . We can make this more precise as follows . Assume 
that C expresses the proper part relation; XCjy says that x is a proper part of y 
at index i. 
(39) a drop: (AQ.Q, drop , dropA), where 
d rop = Ai. { xl l iqu id/x) A ..,3y[ycjx] } , and 
d ropA is a set that satisfies the fol lowing requirements : 
1 .  \ii\ix[l iqu id j(x) � 3P[Pe dropA A Pj(x)) )  
2. \ii\iP\ix[Pe d ropA A P;(x) � l iqu id j(x») 
3.  \ii\iP\iP' [Pe d ropA A P'e d ropA A P:;cP' � ..,3x[Pj(x) A P';(x))) 
In prose, drop is a property that refers to all minimal quantities of liquid, that 
is, to all quantities of liquid x that do not contain proper parts . The set of 
alternatives, dropA, is such that ( 1 )  for each index i ,  if x is a quantity of liquid, 
then there is some property P that applies to x, (2) for each index i and 
property P, P applies only to quantities of liquid, and (3) the properties P are 
disjoint. Conditions ( 1 )-(3) are necessary requirements that may be refined, for 
example by requiring that each alternative property applies to quantities of 
liquid of a certain size. I am aware that conditions ( 1 )-(3) do not define a 
unique d ropA, but I will not be more specific here as any set of properties that 
satisfies them will do for our purposes. 
Other NPls of this type can be analyzed in a similar fashion. For 
example, a word is based on minimal utterances , a red cent is based on 
minimal amounts of money, lift a finger is based on minimal amounts of labor, 
and bat an eye is based on mimimal reactions to threatening events. It is 
obvious that these expressions have to be understood in their non-literal 
meaning:  They are idiomatic expressions that denote bottom elements of 
certain ontological sorts . 
Now, observe that NPls like a drop and their ilk are not directly based 
on informativity under the reconstruction given above. However, they lead to 
alternative assertions based on informativity under a certain plausible 
assumption (cf. also Fauconnier 1 980). It is perhaps best to discuss this using 
an example: 
(40) a. *Mary drank a drop. 
(AQ. { il 3y[Qj(Y) A drank;(m ,y)] } , drop , dropA) 
b. Mary didn't drink a drop. 
(AQ. { i1 ..,3y[Q(y) A dranklm ,y)] } ,  drop, dropA) 
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We want to derive that (40.a) is bad as an as sertion, whereas (40 . b) is good. 
We can do so under the plausible assumption that if someone drinks 
something, he drinks every part of it. Let us call this principle, in general , 
"involvement of parts " (4 1 ) .  A corollary to this principle is (42) : If someone 
drinks some quantity of liquid , he also drinks minimal quantities , as every 
quantity of liquid will contain minimal quantities. 
(42) V'iV'xV'y[d rin k j(x ,y) /\ l i qu i d ly) � 3z[d rop ;(z) /\ dr ink j(x ,z)] ]  
A second principle is that the predicate d rop applies to liquid quantities of  an 
idealized small size. We can capture this by requiring of natural common 
grounds c that the proposition that someone drank just a minimal quantity of 
liquid should always be less probable than that someone drank a more 
substantial quantitiy of liquid . Let us call this the "principle of extremity" :  
(43) For all natural common grounds c: 
{ i l V'xV'y[d rin k j(x,y) /\ d rop j(Y) /\ -,3z[ycjz /\ d rink(x,z)J ] }  <c 
{ il V'xV'y[drink j(x,y) /\ d rop;(y) /\ 3z[ycjz /\ d rink(x,z)] ] } 
Let us come back to examples (40.a,b) in the light of these principles . First 
note that the NPIs in question are all strong; they bear heavy stress  and can 
easily be combined with even. Hence we should as sume emphatic assertion. In 
(40.a), the proposition asserted with respect to the input common ground c, 
l iE d 3y[drop ;(y) /\ d rankj(m ,y)] } ,  is at most as strong as any alternative 
assertion l iE d 3y[Pj(y) /\ d rank j(m ,y)] } ,  PE d ropA,  according to involvement 
of parts (41 ), and in fact weaker if c is a natural common ground according to 
extremity (43). This directly contradicts condition (3 1 .a). In (40.b), the 
proposition asserted, l iE d  -,3y[d ropj(y) /\ d rankj(m ,y)] } ,  is truly stronger than 
any alternative assertion l iE d  -,3y[Pj(y) /\ dran kj(m ,y)] } ,  PE dropA for every 
natural common ground c due to extremity, which abides by condition (3 1 .a). 
The principle of extremity has an interesting consequence. Without it 
it should be possible to use a sentence like Mary drank a drop to express that 
Mary drank only a minimal amount. This may even be possible in hyperbolic 
figures of speech. The principle of extremity, however, excludes that, as it 
would hold in the output common ground that the probability that Mary just 
drank a drop is I ,  whereas the probability that Mary drank more than a drop 
is O. 
Other NPIs of this type, like lift a finger or a red cent, can be 
explained in a similar way. Interestingly, there are a few NPIs that are based 
on predicates that denote "large" entities : 
(44) a. Wild horses couldn't drag me in there. 
b. We will not know the truth { in weeks / in a million years } .  
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The basic reasoning is quite similar to the former case. For example ,  ill weeks 
and in a million years refers to a time that is maximally distant in the future 
with respect to a given context We as sume a general default rule that, if a 
person knows something at a time t, then he knows it at any time l' later than 
t. Then the claim that we will not know it at time that is maximally distant in 
the future is stronger than the claim that we will not know it to some other 
time . In addition we have the extremity principle, which says here that it is less 
likely that we will know the truth only at the most distant future time, than that 
we know the truth already at some earlier time. This is the setting that results 
in good emphatic assertions. 
It should be immediately obvious that NPls based on small or large 
entities are not exhaustive, and hence strong. Take the case a drop; if d rop 
applies just  to minimal liquid quantities and all the alternatives in  d ropA apply 
to bigger liquid quantities, then we have drop :¢ ndrop , and even d rop  n 
udropA = 0. And when we take larger expressions that contain a drop, like 
drink a drop, then we fmd due to involvement of parts and extremity that for 
every natural context c, Aie cA.x3y[dropj  1\ drinkj(x,y)] c u { IJ.e cWy[Pj 1\ 
drink j(x,y)] 1 Pe dropA } ,  as those worlds in which someone just drank a drop 
are considered most unlikely. 
The theory developed above can be applied to positive polarity items 
(PPIs) , as in the following case: 
(45) a. John has TONS of money. 
b. *John doesn't have tons of money. 
[o.k. as a denial of (a) or with contrastive focus on tons] 
The expression tons of forms PPls . For example, tons of money applies to 
maximal amounts of money, i .e. amounts of money that are higher than some 
very high threshold value, and its alternatives are properties that apply to 
smaller amounts of money. We can assume involvement of parts : If John owns 
x, John also owns the parts of x. Furthermore, we can assume extremity: For 
every natural context c it is more likely that someone has a less  than maximal 
amount of money, than a maximal amount of money. Then the proposition that 
John owns a maximal amount of money is stronger than any proposition that 
John owns some other amount. According to the by now familiar scheme, this 
makes (45.a) a good assertion. On the other hand, the proposition that John 
doesn't own a maximal amount of money is weaker than the proposition that 
John doesn't own some other amount, and hence (45.b) is a bad assertion. 
7. The Locus of Exploitation of Polarity Items 
Under the semantico-pragmatic account of  polarity items we would 
expect that polarity items under more than one licensing operator show a flip­
flop behavior. This is indeed attested. Baker ( 1 970) pointed it out for PPIs with 
examples of the following kind: 
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(46) a. I would rather be in Montpellier. 
b .  ??I wouldn't rather be in Montpellier. 
c. There isn't anyone in the camp who wouldn't rather be in Montpellier. 
Sentence (46.b) is acceptable only if the concept of "would rather be in 
Montpellier" has been mentioned before; typically, either I or wouldn 't are 
stres sed in these cases .  -- Schmerling ( 1 97 1 )  showed that we find a similar 
"flip-flop" behavior with NPls : 
(47) a. *There was someone who did a thing to help. 
b. There was no one who did a thing to help. 
c. *There was no one who didn't do a thing to help. 
These grammaticality judgements can be immediately explanined from the 
semantics of licensers . As with the complement law in standard Boolean 
interpretation, which states the equivalence of ....-4> and cl>, we can derive that 
application of two DE operators creates an upward entailing context. 
However, there are cases where an NPI occurs in the scope of two 
licensing operators , which seems to be a true paradox for any semantic theory 
of polarity items . Hoeksema ( 1986) discusses cases of NPIs in the protasis of 
conditionals like (48),  and Dowty ( 1994) presents cases of NPls in the scope 
of downward-entailing adverbial quantifiers (cf. 49) : 
(48) a. If he knows anything about logic, he will know Modus Ponens. 
b. If he doesn't know anything about logic, he will not know M.P. 
(49) a. She very rarely eats anything at all for lunch. 
b. She very rarely doesn't eat anything at all for lunch. 
Ladusaw ( 1979) was aware of these facts : The implementation of his theory 
requires that an NPl be licensed by one downward-entailing operator; once 
licensed, it will stay licensed. Dowty (1994) suggests a distinction between 
semantic licensing based on downward-entailingness, and syntactic licensing 
that suppresses the flip-flop behavior of semantic licensing. But the solutions 
that have been presented for doubly-licensed NPls are problematic for the 
semantico-pragmatic account of polarity items as they work with various 
principles that are extraneous to the idea that polarity items are used to express  
relatively "strong" propositions. 
The phenomenon of doubly-licensed polarity items can be explained 
within the theory developed here if we allow for a more flexible way how the 
semantic contribution of polarity items is pragmatically exploited. Independent 
evidence for flexible exploitation comes from cases like the following one: 
(50) The student who had not. read anything gave improvised answers. 
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According to the theory developed so far, (50) would be analyzed as follows :  
The NPI anything introduces alternatives in the usual way. These  alternatives 
are projected in semantic compositions , and the negation in the relative clause 
reverses the specificity ordering. The as sertion operator then makes use of the 
resulting alternatives : 
(50') Assert« AQAi.ga ve. im provised .answersj(tx[stu d entj(x) /\ 
...,3y[rea d j(x,y) /\ Q;Cy)] ] ) , th ing ,  { PI Pcthi n g } ) 
But notice that the definite NP does not project the semantic specificity relation 
between the foreground th ing  and its alternatives . For example, if John is the 
student who had not read anything, then replacing th ing  by some alternative 
P, Pcthing will either give us the same proposition , or it will result in a 
presupposition failure (if there is another student who did read something but 
not P). Hence (50') cannot be an adequate representation of (50). 
Obviously the NPI in (50) is licensed locally in its clause. Assuming 
that the alternatives introduced by polarity items are always exploited by 
ilIocutionary operators we have to assume that such operators can occur in 
embedded clauses : 
(50") Assert [The student [(Scal)Assert [who had not read anything]] gave 
improvised answers] 
It is the downstairs (Scal)Assert operator that makes use of the alternatives 
introduced by the NPI. In doing so this operator will neutralize these 
alternatives , making them unavailable for the upstairs A ssert operator. 
In order to implement this idea we would have to develop a framework 
in which ilIocutionary operators are part of the semantic recursion. This could 
be done within a dynamic framework in which semantic representations are 
functions from input information states to output states .  For reasons of space, 
I will not do this here; see Krifka (in prep.) for a version. 
The cases of doubly-licensed polarity items can be explained in a 
similar way. Our examples (48) and (49) get analyses along the following 
lines : 
(48')a. ScalAssert [If he knows anything about logic, he will know MP] 
b. Assert [if ScalAssert[he doesn't know anything about logic] 
he will not know MP] 
(49')a. ScalAssert [few s (s is a lunch-situation)(Mary eats anything at s)] 
b. Assert [few s (s is a lunch-situation) 
(ScalAssert[Mary doesn't eat anything at sm 
Notice that in each case the NPI is licensed: In (48'.a) and (49'.a) it is licensed 
globally through the semantics of the main operator (the protasis of conditional 
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sentence and the nuclear scope of the adverbial quantifier rarely, which 
corresponds to Jew), and in (48' . b) and (49' .b) it i s  licenensed locally in its 
clause. 
One obvious question at this point is : Where can polarity items be 
exploited? I suggest that they can always be exploited at the level of the 
clause. In the case of (48 .b) the polarity item is exploited at the level of the 
protasis of a conditional, which is a syntactic clause.  In the case of (49.b) it is 
exploited at the level of the nuclear scope of an adverbial quantifier, which is 
clause-like for semantic reasons (cf. e .g .  Heim 1 982).  This predicts that 
examples like (46.b) and (47.c) should be grammatical as well, as the polarity 
items may be licensed locally. In seems to me that the grammaticality 
judgements for these sentences given in the literature are indeed questionable. 
They may be due to the fact that sentences (a) , (b) and (c) are presented one 
after another and a certain interpretation -- the one with a single, wide-scope 
illocutionary operator -- is kept constant for every sentence. 
Another, related question is : What forces the assumption of operators 
that make use of alternatives? I think that the general principle is that a 
sentence must end up as being pragmatically well-formed. Consider the 
following cases :  
(5 1 )  a. ScalAssert [Mary rarely eats anything for lunch] 
b .  Assert[Mary rarely ScalAssert[doesn't eat anything] for lunch] 
c. *ScaIAssert [Mary rarely doesn't eat anything for lunch] 
d. *ScaIAssert[Mary rarely ScalAssert [doesn't eat anything] for lunch] ] 
As we have seen, (S 1 .a,b) are pragmatically well-formed. (S 1 .c) is bad because 
there is no information state that would satisfy the requirements of ScalAssert. 
And (5 1 .d) is bad as the NPI alternatives ,  so to speak, are already "used up" 
by the first S calAssert operator. 
There is one important relation between the locus of exploitation of 
alternatives and accent marking. Following Jacobs ( 199 1 ), we can assume that 
the focus that is associated with the highest focus-sensitive operator, that is, the 
illocutionary operator over the sentence, is marked by the main stress in the 
sentence. Assuming that the NPI is in focus ,  which is regularly the case with 
emphatic assertions, we would assume that the NPI can have the main stress 
in (86.a), but not in (86.b). This is indeed the case: 
(S l ')a. Mary rarely eats ANYthing for lunch. 
b .  *Mary rarely doesn't eat ANYthing for lunch. 
8.  Locality R estrictions 
One type of phenomenon that has been discussed as showing that 
polarity items are licensed syntactically are the various locality restrictions that 
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have been observed , especially by Linebarger. In this section I will show that 
a semantic treatment of locality phenomena seems feasible as well . 
Certain cases that have been described as showing syntactic island 
effects for NPls can be traced back to the failure of certain semantic 
constructions to project BFA structures proper/y o Take for example the contrast 
between the following sentences which shows that definite NPs, but not 
indefinite (non-specific) NPs impose resuictions for licensing of NPls : 
(S2) a. Mary never goes out with men who have any problems . 
b .  *Mary never goes out with the man who has any problems . 
This contrast can be explained by the current theory because the definite NP 
in (52.b) does not project the BFA-structure introduced by the NPI, whereas 
the nonspecific NP in (a) does . For (b) we would get the following BFA­
structure: 
(S2')a. (AQAio[go .Ollt .with j(m ,lx3y[m an j(x) 1\ Qj(y) 1\ havelx,y)])] , 
prob lem ,  { PI Pcprob lem } )  
In order for the definite N P  to refer there must b e  a unique man that has 
problems. But notice that strengthening problem to some P, Pcproblem , 
would either pick out the same man, if that man has problem P, or lead to a 
non-referring description, if he does not have problem P (cf. our discussion of 
example SO). Hence no alternative P can ever lead to a stronger proposition. 
This is different in (S2.b) : 
(S2')a. (AQAio3x3y[gO.Ollt.withj(m ,x) 1\ m an j(x) 1\ Q(y) 1\ have j(x,y)] ,  
problem ,  { PI Pcproblem }) 
Note that in this case choosing stronger alternatives may lead to a stronger 
overall proposition; for example, the set of worlds in which Mary doesn't go 
out with men with a specific problem Q may be a subset of the set of worlds 
in which Mary doesn't go out with men with some problem or other. 
Another contrast that seems to call for a syntactic account is illustrated 
with the following pair of examples that illustrates the difference between so­
called bridge verbs and non-bridge verbs : 
(S3) a. Mary didn't think that John had any problems . 
b. ??Mary didn't shout that John had any problems.  
This contrast can be explained by assuming that non-bridge verbs like shout 
are essentially quotational in their basic use and hence embed a structure that 
contains an illocutionary operator. If the embedded structure contains an NPI 
that is still unexploited, this illocutinary operator must be Seal Assert . Hence 
the cases (53.a,b) are analyzed as follows : 
Weak and Strong Polarity Items in Assertions 
(53')a. S c a l A ssert [Mary didn't think that John had any problems]  
b .  A ssert[Mary didn't shout  that Scal A ssert[J ohn had any problems] ]  
We can derive that (53.b) i s  bad as follows : The non-bridge verb shout, being 
quotational, enforces the presence of some illocutionary operator on the 
embedded sentence . In (53 .b) ,  this operator is applied to a BFA structure 
induced by a polarity item, hence it must be Seal Assert, but the pragmatic 
requirements for Sca l A ssert are evidently not satisfied. 
9. C o nclus ion 
Let us come to a conclusion. In this article I have tried to show that we 
can arrive at an explanatory theory of the distribution of polarity items within 
a framework that claims (a) that polarity items introduce alternatives that lead 
to an informativity relation with respect to the meanings of the polarity items 
themselves and their alternatives at the common ground at which they are 
evaluated; and (b) that illocutionary operators make crucial use of this 
information. Polarity items then are just a special case of other constructions 
that introduce alternatives , like expres sions in focus and expressions that are 
part of a linguistic scale and introduce scalar implicatures. In particular, I have 
argued that one can distinguish between weak and strong polarity items in 
purely algebraic terms (exhaustivity vs . non-exhaustivity), and that emphatic 
assertion selects for the property exhibited by strong polarity items. 
For an evaluation of the theory developed here we would have to 
extend our investigations into three directions : ( 1 )  We would have to discuss 
hundreds of polarity items, both positive and negative, to find out whether the 
analysis as expressions that introduce alternatives is feasible. (2) We would 
have to analyze scores of semantic compositions that either block or project the 
alternative orderings introduced by polarity items, and in the latter case, may 
reverse their order. And (3) we would have to discus s various other 
illocutionary forces besides scalar assertion and emphatic assertion that may 
exploit the alternatives introduced by polarity items, such as questions and 
directives . Krifka (in preparation) looks at a wider range of polarity items and 
at other types of illocutionary forces, such as exhaustive assertions , information 
questions ,  and rhetorical questions,  with promising results. 
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